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Abstract
Italy represents an interesting case study for an empirical analysis of the impact of
crime on economic performance. The country, in fact, presents considerable dis-
parities among its regions in terms of economic outcomes and crime rates. Using a
panel data on 19 Italian regions and effective abortion rate as an instrument for crime,
the results indicate that crime substantially affects the level of GDP per capita and
economic growth across Italian regions, especially in the so-called Mezzogiorno.
1
1 Introduction
Convergence in growth rate across Italian regions has been widely investigated by re-
searchers. Previous studies show that convergence is generally not occurring1 except for
the 1960s, when Cassa per il Mezzogiorno2 drove the outcome. However, immediately
after that period, convergence was no longer detectable.
Two of the factors that may explain the lack of convergence and the Italian dualism3
are the large presence of crime and organized crime in Italy.
Crime imposes several costs, not only to individuals that commit offenses. A large
presence of crime in the area may lead to a loss in the opportunities for development and
the Italian case may be one of the best example of this. The literature has shown several
channels through which crime could have affected the Italian development.
The large presence of organized crime in the South of the country discourages firm in-
vestments, including foreign direct investment (FDI). Using data on the Italian provinces
Daniele and Mariani (2010) estimate the impact of crime on FDI inflow. The results
of their analysis show that the correlation between organized crime and FDI inflows is
substantially negative and statistically significant.
A further important channel that could affect the Italian economic performance is the
misallocation of public fundings. Barone and Narcisio (2013) empirically analyze how
mafia affects the allocation of public transfers. Using an instrumental variables approach
they correct for possible simultaneous causality among public fundings and the presence
of Mafia. Their findings suggest that Mafia attracts and absorbs public fundings in Sicily.
Finally, a higher incidence of crime can lead to higher interest rates and reduced access
to credit. Crimes related to organized crime have been shown to affect the loan market
(Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009).
1The results are based on analysis of both GDP per capita and productivity.
2Cassa per il Mezzoggiorno was foundend in the 1950s with the aim of solving the Italian dualism
through several investments in the southern area.
3Italy can be seen as composed by two entities, in terms of economic performance, the North-Center
and the South.
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While the negative effects on the channels affecting the development have already
been explored, the literature that investigates the effect of crime on the Italian economic
performance is not large and the approaches adopted by researchers are varied.
Mauro and Carmeci (2007) use Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators to explore
the link between crime, unemployment and economic activity using Italian regional data.
They find that crime and unemployment have long-run effects on the level of Italian re-
gional income but no long-run growth effects.
Pinotti (2012) uses policy evaluation methods for studying the economic effects of
organized crime in two Italian regions (Apulia and Basilicata) recently exposed to this
phenomenon (since the 1970s). The comparison of actual and counter-factual develop-
ment shows that as murders increase the presence of organized crime lowers the growth
path. Furthermore, lower GDP reflects a net loss in economic activity since private capital
has been substituted with less productive public capital.
Rana and Neanidis (2013) study the effect of organized crime and corruption on the
economic growth of Italian regions between 1983 and 2009, using difference GMM and
system GMM estimators. Their analysis shows that both corruption and organized crime
inhibit growth, but if both phenomena are present together in the area the joint effect is
less severe.
The aim of this study is to analyze the effect of crime on the GDP per capita and eco-
nomic growth of the Italian regions. It contributes to the literature by explicitly addressing
the potential endogeneity issue, e.g. simultaneous causality between GDP per capita and
crime, using an instrument that has its roots in the economics of crime literature.
The chosen instrument for crime is effective abortion rate. Donohue and Levitt (2001)
claim that the link between abortion and crime is causal, while a direct causal link between
effective abortion rate and economic performance is likely to not exist here since the time
span between the two variables is of at least 16 years.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data, the
variables used in the analysis and the importance of the research question. In Section 3
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are presented the theoretical motivations. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology
and discusses the instrument for crime. Section 5 presents the results. Robustness checks
are explored in Section 6. The last section concludes.
2 Data and preliminary analysis
A panel of 19 Italian regions (Aosta Valley is excluded from the analysis) during the
period 1995 - 2011 is used in this work. Data are from ISTAT (Italian National Institute
of Statistics).
The economic performance of the Italian regions is measured by GDP per capita (base
year 2005). The crime variable is given by the homicides rate (attempted and committed)
per 100,000 inhabitants.
Homicides rate may be a good a proxy for organized crime since mafia organizations
use force and fear in order to obtain the control of a certain territory or activity. Moreover,
data on other types of crime, especially the ones related to organized crime (e.g. extor-
tions), are subject to under-reporting and under-recording bias, whereas these problems
are negligible for homicides.
Figure 1 illustrates the variation across Italian regions in terms of GDP per capita and
the homicides rate. Calabria stands out as having the lowest level of GDP per capita and
the highest level of homicide rate. The homicides rate is generally higher in the Southern
part of Italy (where there is a greater presence of organized crime) and GDP per capita
is lower. This may be due to reverse causality. GDP per capita may be lower because of
the presence of crime and organized crime, and the large presence of crime and organized
crime may be due to the economic situation of these regions. As shown in Figure 2, there
is a clear negative correlation between GDP per capita and homicide rate (the OLS fitted
values are also presented in figure 2).
Because of possible reverse causality an instrumental variables approach will be adopted
in this work. The approach involves the choice of an appropriate instrument that is, for
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this case, the “effective abortion rate”.
Additional variables included in the analysis and used as control variables are the
ratio of investment to GDP, the ratio of regional government spending in construction and
regional planning to total regional government spending, the dropout rate after one year
of high school, the long-run unemployment rate, population density and an index of social
capital (ratio of people engaged in volunteering activities aged at least 14 over the total
population aged at least 14) and the rate of firm creation (difference between the number
of firms created in year t and the firms died in the same year over the number of firms
existing the year before in the region).
The selection of control variables is suggested by the economic growth and economics
of crime literatures. Investments are a primary source of growth, while the government
spending in construction is preferred to the total because it contributes to the GDP and
crime at the same time. The drop-out rate is used here, instead of the level of human capi-
tal, to control for the young people that may choose crime over employment opportunities.
The long-run unemployment rate helps to control for the deficiencies of the labor market,
especially in the Southern area. Social capital, as suggested by the literature, is likely to
be one of the factor explaining the level of economic activity and be negatively correlated
with crime. In particular, the social capital index is created following the work of Put-
nam (1993, 2000). According to Putnam (2000), the most general forms of social capital
are trust and social participation. Volunteering activity falls in the latter category. Put-
nam argues that participation in voluntary organizations and social associations promotes
among the members collective norms and trust which is fundamental for the production
and the maintenance of the community’s well-being. Hence, the use of the ratio of people
engaged in volunteering activities aged at least 14 to the total population aged at least 14
partly captures the social capital present in the region.
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Figure 1: Heterogeneity across Italian regions in terms of GDP per capita and homicide
rate (per 100,000 inhabitants)
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis can be found in Table 1.
Figure 2: GDP per capita and homicide rate
Calabria has the lowest level of GDP per capita (1995) and the highest homicide rate
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(in 1996). Lombardy has the highest GDP per capita (in 2007), while the lowest growth
rate is in Piedmont (in 2009).
The variables that may affect the economy in a negative way, such as the dropout rate
and long-run unemployment rate, are higher in the Southern regions
Table 1: Summary statistics
VARIABLES Mean St. Dev. Min Max
GDP per capita 22,659 5,668 12,892 31,848
Homicide rate 3.682 2.267 0.89 13.35
Growth rate (%) 0.439 2.390 -9.132 5.315
I/GDP 0.213 0.0276 0.152 0.304
Construction/Government spending 20,728 3,511 10,486 28,057
Long-run unemployment rate 4.597 3.345 0.400 15
Dropout rate (%) 10.75 2.715 5 18.30
Population density 197.3 107.2 58.70 434.5
Rate of firms creation (%) 1.38 1.075 -2.67 6.29
Social capital (%) 11.08 4.854 4.421 27.70
All the variables are used in logarithmic terms except for population density and rate
of firms creation.
Hereafter, the term South is used to denote the macro-area formed by Campania, Apu-
lia, Basilicata, Calabria and Sicily.
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3 Theoretical motivation
The output of region i at time t is assumed to be obtain with the following production
function:
Yit = F(Kit ,Ait(Crit)Lit) (1)
that is a production function with labour-augmenting technological progress.Yit is a
function of capital (Kit , that depreciates at a rateδ ), technological progress (Ait , that grows
at a rate g), and labour (Lit , that grows at a rate n).
The difference respect the Solow growth model is in the term Ait , here the technologi-
cal progress is a function of crime, in particular δAitδCrit < 0.Hence, as the crime level in the
economy increases the technological progress decreases.
The other conditions are the same of the Solow growth model.
Assuming that the return to scale are constant, the output can be rewritten in terms of
output per efficiency unit of labour as:
yit =
Yit
Ait(Crit)Lit
=
1
Ait(Crit)Lit
F(Kit ,A(Crit)Lit) = f (kit) (2)
where kit = KitAit(Crit)Lit .
High presence of crime in the region implies that resources are wasted for protection
and prevention and investment are discouraged. Moreover, money may be taken away
from the legal economy through pizzo4 if mafia organizations are present in the region.
This leads to a resource constraint, in intensive form, for the economy given by:
cit + iit +(wastedresources)it = yit = f (kit) (3)
where the wasted resources are funded by a tax that depends on the level of crime
4“Pizzo” is an Italian word derived from the Sicilian word “pizzu” that means extortion. It indicates the
money paid by business to Mafia for protection.
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present in the region, wastedresourcesit = τ(Crit)yit .
The net accumulation of physical capital is given by
.
Kit = Iit−δKit , with investments
equal to savings and as following: Iit = Sit = (1− τ(Crit))sYit−Cit .
Using the last two equations, we get :
.
Kit = (1− τ(Crit))sYit−Cit−δKit (4)
That gives the following fundamental Solow Equation of motion:
.
kit = (1− τ(Crit))s f (kit)− kit(δ +g+n) (5)
From equation (5) emerges that a higher tax implies a lower level of capital accumu-
lation, that will be associated with a lower level of output. The intuition is similar to the
one present in the Solow growth model with unproductive government spending.
The equations presented in this section will not be estimated but some of its elements
can be found in the empirical part, e.g. investment and population density as proxy for
population growth.
The theoretical framework gives an intuition on how crime can affect the output and
justify the idea of the work.
4 Empirical methodology
The empirical model which has GDP per capita as dependent variable is:
Yit = αi +β1t +β2Crimeit +
m
∑
j=1
γ jX j,it +δ1DUit + εit (6)
where Yit is the logarithm of GDP per capita in region i in period t, t is a time trend,
Crimeit is the logarithm of the homicides rate, X j,it are control variables comprising the
ratio of investment to GDP, the ratio of regional government spending in construction and
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regional planning to total regional government spending, the drop out rate after one year
of high school, the long run unemployment rate, the population density and an index of
social capital, and the rate of firm creation. DUit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1
if t > TB (where TB denotes the structural break) and 0 otherwise. αi is a time-invariant
region specific effect, and ε it is the error term.
Equation (6) will also be estimated with the two stage least square method (2SLS)
using an instrument for crime in order to further take into account potential endogeneity
problems.
The choice of the instrument is explained in subsection 4.1.
The empirical model that uses the growth rate as the dependent variable is:
Yit−Yit−1 = β1Yit−1 +β2Crimeit +
m
∑
j=1
γ jX j,it +δ1DUit + εit (7)
the new regressor Yit−1 may be correlated with the error term and thus be potentially
endogenous.5
Equation (7) is estimated using the System GMM6 developed by Arellano-Bond (1991),
Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998)7.
A difficulty associated with this estimator relates to the choice of the number of lags
to use in order to obtain the instruments. In estimating equation (7), a lag of two to a
maximum of three is used and the instruments are collapsed8.
5The specification does not include a trend since Yt is I(1). Thus, passing to first difference eliminates
the trend.
6The use of the system GMM estimators allows to wipe out the region fixed effects.
7System-GMM estimation treats the model as a system of equations in first-differences and in levels. It
uses the lags of the potential endogenous variables in order to obtain internal instruments that will be used
in this work in addition to the external instrument used in the 2SLS estimation.
8Collapsing instruments allows to reduce the number of instruments through the creation of one instru-
ment for each variable and lag distance, instead of one instrument for each time period, variable, and lag
distance. In addition, the limitation of the number of lags helps in achieving the goal of having a number of
instruments smaller than the number of entities composing the panel.
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4.1 The instrument for crime
In the economics of crime literature, Donohue and Levitt (2001) argue that a decline in
crime rates in the US, during the 1990s, followed from the abortion legalization. The
claim is that the link between abortion and crime is causal.
Their main argument is the following: legalized abortion may lead to reduced crime
either through a cohort size effect and/or thought possible lower rates of criminality for
children born after the abortion legislation.
The first argument relies on the fact that when the cohort reaches the “criminal age”
there will be fewer people in their highest - propensity crime years and thus less crime.
The second argument follows from two points: women who choose abortion are the ones
that are more likely to give birth to children that later may engage in criminal activity; and
second, women’s ability to child care may vary with age, education and income, hence
abortion may be used to optimize the timing of child-bearing9.
In Italy, abortion was legalized in 1978 through law 194/1978. This law allows a
woman to stop her pregnancy during the first 90 days of child-bearing in a public structure,
e.g. hospital. Data on abortion rate for 1,000 women are available from 1979, the first
full year that the law had an effect. Data on GDP per capita and crime are available from
1995 to 2011. This allows to build up an instrument that follows Levitt’s considerations.
The instrument is constructed as follows:
E f f ectiveAbortionit =∑
a
Abit−a (8)
The effective abortion for region i at time t is given by the sum of the abortion rate in
that region at time t - a, where a is the age of the cohort.
The abortion data covers the period 1979 - 1995. Hence, for 1995 the effective abor-
9Unfortunately, there are few information about women who choose abortion in Italy during the time
period of interest. The available informations reveal that at least 27% of women choosing abortion are not
married (the percentage increase with time) and that an increase in the level of schooling corresponds to a
decrease in abortion.
11
tion rate is the abortion rate in 1979 (the cohort age is 16 years old). For 1996, the
effective abortion rate is the abortion in 1979 plus the abortion rate in 1980 (cohort age:
16 and 17). This is repeated until 2011 where the last cohort is the one born in 1995.
Construction of the instrument is different from the effective abortion rate proposed
by Donohue and Levitt (2001) since the aim of this work is different. In this study, the
effective abortion rate is only an instrument for crime.
Importantly, a direct causal link between the effective abortion rate and economic
performance is likely to not exist since the time span between the two variables is of at
least 16 years. Hence, effective abortion is likely to affect the dependent variable only
through its effect on crime.
Using the instrument in the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) procedure for the estima-
tion of equation (6) leads to the following first stage equation:
Crimeit = αi +β1t +pi1E f f ectiveAbortionit +
m
∑
j=1
γ jX j,it +δ1DUit + vit (9)
5 Results
In the following the results will be presented for the full specification and for a specifica-
tion without the time factor; this is done since the results with the time specification have
to be read carefully because of the structural break10.
If the thesis that crime is one of the factor explaining the Italian dualism is right, the
result of the regression should show a negative effect of homicides rate on the GDP per
capita. Moreover, it may be that using homicides rate as crime variable we can capture
part of the effect that organized crime has on the economy, especially on the South one
where the organized crime presence is higher11. If this is the case, the homicide rate
10The presence of a structural break for the period 2008-2009 has been detected using the Chow test.
11Organized crime organizations use force and fear in order to achieve the control of a territory or activity,
homicide is one of their most used “tool”.
Furthermore, the correlation between the homicide rate and mafia homicides is 0.82 as shown in the
appendix.
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must have a higher negative effect than other types of crime (such as bank robberies and
bag-snatching) which do not necessary require a mafia organization to take place.
In the following the results of the estimations are presented. Table 2 shows Pooled
OLS (POLS) and fixed effects results.
The two approaches present different magnitudes of the effect of crime but it is highly
significant in both specifications.
As previously argued, the estimation via the two cited methods is not adequate since
there may be reverse causality between GDP per capita and crime, hence a potential en-
dogeneity problem.
Table 2: POLS and fixed effects estimation of equation (6)
POLS Fixed Effects
Homicide rate -0.349*** -0.351*** -0.084*** -0.091*** -0.043** -0.042*** -0.040** -0.037**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014)
Control variables no no yes yes no no yes yes
Time specification no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 323
R2 0.486 0.502 0.892 0.896 0.04 0.483 0.510 0.641
Adj. R2 0.484 0.497 0.889 0.893 0.037 0.478 0.497 0.630
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard error in parenthesis
Hereafter, the analysis in conducted on the sample comprising 19 Italian regions and
a sub-sample of 5 of them (South in the tables): Apulia, Calabria, Campania, Basilicata
and Sicily.
Table 3 presents the effect of effective abortion rate on GDP per capita. The results
of Table 3 supports the claim that the instrument has an effect on the GDP per capita
through its effect on crime. If it is true that the effective abortion rate has a negative effect
on crime, one would expect a positive effect on GDP through the reduction on crime.
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Table 3: Reduced form results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable:
GDP per capitait Italy South
Effective abortion rate 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.029***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 0.005 (0.006) (0.005)
Control variables no yes yes no yes yes
Time specification no no yes no no yes
Observations 323 323 323 85 85 85
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard error in parenthesis
The first stage regression results presented in Table 4 allow us to understand the de-
terminants of homicides rate in the two samples.
From Table 4 some striking results emerge. First, the long run unemployment rate12
has a different direction effect on homicide rate for the two groups of regions. Second, the
variable construction/(government spending) changes drastically magnitude and signifi-
cance when the analysis is for South. This is coherent with the idea that using homicides
rate as a proxy for organized crime, we may capture the possible distortion of the alloca-
tion of government spending for constructions and regional planning. The most known
case is “Sacco di Palermo”13. It is with this event that mafia realized that lucrative gains
could be achieved through the government spending in constructions. Social capital as-
sumes the expected sign for both groups (in line with the results obtained in other studies
where the emphasis is on the effect of social capital on crime and with the definition of
social capital presented before), the same is true for the population density.
The results of the first stage regressions indicate that the the effective abortion rate has
a negative impact on crime (as argued by Levitt) and is highly significant. Furthermore,
the coefficient of the instrument is higher when the sample is restricted to the Southern
12The long-run unemployment rate has been chosen in order to capture the structural deficiencies of the
Southern Italy labor market and its effect on crime shows how when other opportunities are really difficult
to find, people may end up committing crime.
13“Sacco di Palermo” is a term that describes the extensive construction that took place in Palermo during
the 1950s and 1960s in which Mafia took part through the use of Mafia-controlled firms.
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regions.
The F statistic for the excluded instrument shows that the instrument is not weak.
Additionally, the endogenous regressor is not under-identified. The Angrist-Pischke (AP)
first-stage chi-squared statistic clearly shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected.
Table 5 displays the 2SLS results of equation (6) estimation.
The results imply that if the homicide rate increases by 1% then the GDP per capita
will decrease by 0.32%. Restricting the sample to Southern regions the corresponding
decrease is 0.26%. When the time trend is included, the magnitude of the effect becomes
bigger for South and smaller for Italy while remaining significant at 1% level . It may be
that the change in magnitude derive from the 2008-2009 economic crisis. This crisis leads
to a stronger negative effect of crime on Southern economy. In sum, the results clearly
show that the major effect of crime is on part of the Italian Mezzogiorno.
Comparing Tables 2 and 5, it emerges that the effect of crime on GDP is upward biased
in the POLS and fixed effects specifications. A possible explanation may be corruption
(not explored in this work). The literature argues that if corruption is organized then the
effect on the economy may be less severe (Rana and Neandis, 2013).
5.1 The effect of crime on the economic growth
Estimating the effect of crime on the growth rate, using a dynamic panel model, leads to
two potentially endogenous regressors. The estimator adopted to control for the potential
endogeneity problem is the system GMM (Arellano-Bond (1991), Arellano-Bover (1995)
and Blundell-Bond (1998)). Despite the Difference GMM, the system GMM estimator
uses the lags of the potential endogenous variables in level and first differences for the
construction of “internal” instruments and collapsing instruments avoids their prolifera-
tion. In addition, the external instrument already used in the 2SLS estimation (effective
abortion rate) can still be used together with the internal ones.
The system GMM results are reported in Table 6.
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The trend is absent since the dependent variable is I(1) and one of most common
methods for detrending is the use of the first differences. Additional time effect is captured
by DUit .
Column (2) shows that crime produces a negative effect on the growth rate. An in-
crease of 1% in the homicide rate leads to a decrease in the growth rate of 0.14% if DUit is
excluded. The magnitude increases if DUit enters as control (0.15%). These magnitudes
are substantial considering that Italy has experienced low growth rate and periods of re-
cession for the past 20 years. Additionally, the results are consistent with the absence of
convergence across the Italian regions. In fact, as previously showed, homicide rate has a
strong effect when the sample is restricted to the Southern regions only.
To verify the validity of the instruments two tests are conducted. The first test is the
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences. Here, the null hypothesis is the absence
of auto-correlation in the residuals using a lag length of two. The null hypothesis cannot
be rejected, implying that the instruments are not endogenous.
The second, Hansen test, checks the validity of the instruments under the null hypoth-
esis that the covariance among the instruments and the error term is zero. Again, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. Thus, the instruments are exogenous.
The results presented in this section illustrate that crime has a significant and negative
impact on economic performances. Since the homicide rate, typically associated with
organized crime associations, is higher in Southern Italy, the results suggest that organized
crime can partially explain the lack of convergence across regions in Italy and the Italian
dualism.
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Table 6: Estimation of the effect of crime on the economic growth
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
4GDP per capitait
GDP per capitait−1 0.001 -0.058 -0.057
(0.002) (0.077) (0.073)
Homicide rate 0.002 -0.136* -0.150**
(0.015) (0.075) (0.069)
Long-run unemployment rate 0.007 0.009
(0.026) (0.042)
I/GDP 0.024 0.029
(0.052) (0.047)
Construction/Government spending 0.040 0.036
(0.070) (0.068)
Dropout rate 0.088 0.104
(0.064) (0.075)
Social capital -0.067 -0.066
(0.065) (0.099)
Population density 0.001 0.001
(0.0001) (0.001)
Rate of firm creation 0.015** 0.016**
(0.005) (0.007)
DU -0.002
(0.017)
Control variables no yes yes
Observations 304 304 304
No. of instruments 7 13 14
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences, -3.27 -1.54 -1.34
p-value 0.001 0.123 0.179
Hansen test, 16.41 5.83 6.42
p-value 0.006 0.212 0.170
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard error in brackets
6 Robustness checks
If organized crime is one of the factor explaining the dualism that characterizes Italy, then
considering other types of crime, not associated solely with an organized crime associa-
tion of mafia type and whose distribution is more homogeneous among regions, should
lead to different results.
The two crimes chosen in order to test the validity of the thesis are: bank robberies
(per 100,000 inhabitants) and bag-snatching (per 100,000 inhabitant). The choice of these
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two particular crimes is related to their nature: the first, does not necessary need a crim-
inal organization of mafia type to take place, and the second does not need any type of
organization.
Figure 3 presents a descriptive analysis of data on bank robberies and bag-snatching.
The figure shows that the level of bag-snatching is almost uniform across the regions but
bank robberies rate is higher for regions with a higher GDP per capita.
Equations (6) and (7) are re-estimated using bank robberies and bag-snatching instead
of the homicide rate and without the time specification. The results of the 2SLS estimation
are presented in Table 7. The results of system GMM are found in Table 8.
In Table 7, the results of the first stage for both variables are reported in columns (1)
and (2) while columns (3) and (4) report second stage regression results. Bank robberies
and bag-snatching have a negative and significant effect on GDP per capita, but it is
smaller than the effect of homicides. The statistics indicate that the instrument is not
weak in both regressions, and the potential endogenous regressor is not under-identified.
Moreover, the magnitude of the effective abortion rate, in both cases, is larger than in the
correspond estimates using homicides rate.
In Table 8 are reported the effects of bank robberies and bag-snatching on economic
growth. Results for bank robberies are in column (1) and results for bag-snatching are in
column (2).
The results indicate that bank robberies has a negative but insignificant effect on eco-
nomic growth. Bag-snatching has a small and insignificant positive effect on economic
growth.
The tests for the validity of the instruments reported in Table 8 clearly reveal that the
null hypothesis of absence of covariance among the instruments and the error term cannot
be rejected. Thus, the instruments are valid.
This section showed how crimes that may not be related to organized crime have a
smaller effect on the economic performance of Italian regions if compared to homicides
(usually related to mafia associations). Hence, the homicide rate may be a good proxy for
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organized crime and manages to partially capture its effects.
Table 8: The effect of bank robberies and bag-snatching on the economic growth of Italian
regions
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
4GDP per capitait
GDP per capitait−1 0.027 0.053
(0.115) (0.111)
Bank robberies -0.038
(0.037)
Bag-snatching 0.041
(0.073)
Long-run unemployment rate 0.166 0.140
(0.203) (0.122)
I/GDP 0.079 0.140
(0.133) (0.248)
Construction/Government spending 0.008 0.029
(0.082) (0.068)
Dropout rate -0.029 -0.114
(0.024) (0.083)
Social capital 0.017 0.242
(0.032) (0.203)
Population density -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
Gross rate of firm creation 0.002 0.001
(0.006) (0.010)
Observations 304 304
No. of instruments 11 11
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences, -0.39 -0.08
p-value 0.698 0.934
Hansen test, 2.78 2.25
p-value 0.249 0.325
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard error in brackets
7 Conclusions
This study provides estimates of the effect of homicides rate on the economy of the Italian
regions. Homicides rate has been chosen since it may be a proxy for organized crime and
because data on other crimes are not reliable due to under-reporting and under-recording
bias.
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The estimation strategy addresses potential endogeneity issues by using effective abor-
tion rate as an instrument for the homicide rate. The instrument has its roots in the eco-
nomics of crime literature and the statistics presented in the work show its validity.
The empirical exercises indicate that crime may be an important factor explaining
regional economic disparities in Italy.
Additionally, the effect on the economic growth has been estimated using the system
GMM estimator. The results of the latter show that crimes, such as homicide (typically
associated to organized crime) inhibit the growth path, partially explaining the absence of
convergence among Italian regions.
Robustness checks show that other types of crime, that do not require an organized
crime association of mafia type, and whose distribution is more homogeneous among the
Italian regions, have a smaller effects.
This work suggests that organized crime have to be addressed before the implementa-
tion of policies that aim to accelerate economic performance in Italy.
Further research could look at a longer time period, and understand when and through
which channels crime and organized crime started to affect the economy of Southern Italy.
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Appendix
Table 9 shows the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient for organized crime
homicides (per 100,000 inhabitants) and homicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants). It
clearly shows a high dependence among the two variables.
This may confirm the use of the homicide rate to capture some of the effect of orga-
nized crime on the economy.
Table 9: Correlation between mafia homicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) and homicide
rate (attempted and committed, per 100,000 inhabitants)
Mafia homicide rate Homicide rate
Mafia Homicide rate 1
Homicide rate 0.82 1
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